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I. Introduction
Considering issues involved in research trends into Buddhism, my mind im­
mediately moved in the directions one might expect. Which texts cry out for 
translation or retranslation, which historical periods are least understood, which 
rituals need unfolding, which methods—semiotical, deconstructionist, phenom­
enological, structural—need to be applied to which cases, and so on? But this 
is not at all what I’m going to do, and I’m not going to do it for two reasons.
The first reason is that it has been done before, it has been done recently, and 
it has been done well. At the 1980 annual meeting of the American Academy 
of Religion in Dallas, an entire panel was dedicated to just this purpose.’ 
Professors Prebish, Bond, Gdmez and Gimello summoned their collective 
expertise to present Buddhologists with a detailed and demanding agenda for the 
next decade, and I quite frankly have nothing to add on these terms.
However, at this panel, excellent as it was, some theoretical questions were 
raised, questions which force us to examine our own assumptions and prejudices 
as they relate to the scholarly enterprise of Buddhist studies. This is the second 
reason I will not do what my respected colleagues did: there are prior issues, 
more fundamental questions, which must first be discussed.
♦ This paper was first presented at the annual meeting of the New England region 
of the American Academy of Religion, held at Brown University, Providence, R. I., 
on April 3, 1981.
1 “Buddhist Studies in the 1980s” (a panel composed of Charles S. Prebish, chair, 
George D. Bond, Luis O. Gdmez, and Robert Gimello) as listed in the Program of the 
Annual Meeting, 1980, AAR-SBL, nos. A409-A412, p. 76.
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Most of us in Buddhist studies, as much as we appreciate what our colleagues 
in the field are doing, have a vague feeling that we are not taken seriously 
enough by colleagues in the disciplines of religious studies, philosophy, psy­
chology, and so on. To us, our texts are of the greatest intellectual significance; 
yet our colleagues don’t seem to see it this way. Today I will discuss how and 
why this is the case. I’m afraid that a good deal of the fault is ours. I will argue 
that at the root of the problem is how we define ourselves and our discipline, 
and that we contribute to and help to maintain this trivialization of materials 
which are not at all trivial.
II. Buddhism as the “Other”
In order to illustrate the point I am about to make, I would ask you to free 
associate with the word “Asia.” Which adjectives come to mind when one hears 
this word? I tried this with my students at Williams, and the adjectives that 
came up, not untypically, were “mysterious,” “backward,” “motherly,” “tra­
ditional” or “unchanging,” “mystical,” “passive,” “pessimistic” or “fatalistic,” 
and so on.
These terms serve to indicate the parameters of a “discourse,” in Michel 
Foucault’s sense of the term. I shall argue that this discourse cannot be dismissed 
as a simple, popular misconception: rather, it is a discourse in part established 
and maintained by scholars of Asia, we Buddhologists included.
Immediately apparent is that this Asia discourse bears striking resemblances 
to sexist discourse: that is, what westerners say about Asia is disturbingly close 
to what men say about women. As with sexist discourse, this Asia discourse 
contains romanticizing as well as disparaging units, and such a discourse is made 
up of dialectical pairs which at one and the same time tend towards romanticiz­
ing and derogating. Just this phenomenon has demanded the attention of 
feminist thinkers as well. In that context it is called the “pedestal effect.” Men 
evidence a strong ambivalence about women by discourse that does not merely 
demean, but also idealizes. This idealization serves the purpose of avoiding 
genuine encounter with the other. To be in dialogue with the other, as Buber 
tells us, means to encounter them as persons and not as projections.2 Our Asia 
discourse, then, is a system of projections, both romanticizing and derogating, 
but all trivializing. The net effect of this discourse is to mitigate against both 
encounter and understanding.
2 Martin Buber, 1 and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Scribners, 1970), 
p. 59.
This discourse establishes and reveals a structure. Through this structure, 
Asia in general and Buddhism in particular are seen as passive, as mysterious, 
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and in need of the activity of revealing and interpreting. Historically, the scholar 
of Asia has seen his task as representing his object of study to the west. This 
process of re-presenting entails that Asia or Buddhism is something mute which 
becomes vocalized by and through our re-presentations, our Asia discourse, 
which Edward Said aptly labels “orientalism.*’3
3 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
4 Herbert Marcuse argues that a reliance upon “facts” or “objectivity” is a per­
nicious attitude which invites fascism, since “facts” have no meaning apart from the 
context in which they are understood. See Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left: 
Wilhelm Reich, Ceza Roheim, and Herbert Marcuse (New York: Harper Colophon, 
1969), p. 167.
5 Said, Orientalism, p. 3.
Orientalism is a discourse; we orientalize Asia. We make it into something 
alien, both from ourselves and from itself, largely by our false dichotomization 
of our planet into an “east” and a “west” and, as we all know, “never the twain 
shall meet.” Our knowledge of Asia, then, follows an epistemological structure 
of activism and passivity; we scholars are the active re-presenters of a passive 
tradition.
This epistemological structure, Said goes on to tell us, follows a political one: 
the experience of imperialism. This activism/passivity structure did and could 
only arise in the context of European empire building. The intellectual structure 
itself reflects and maintains socio-political structures. We all believe that Bud­
dhism has contributed vastly to human thought; but these contributions are 
clouded over by a pernicious orientalist-imperialist epistemology which, once 
assumed, insidiously perpetuates itself in both popular and scholarly re-presenta- 
tions of Asia. The orientalist approach trivializes Asia by romanticizing it or by 
objectifying it into irreducible “facts,” prohibiting any genuine intercultural 
dialogue.4 As Said writes, “Orientalism [is]... a western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient”5
What this implies are the views that, on the one hand, hold Asia to be the 
source of all wisdom which we “merely translate” and must uncritically accept, 
the devotee position; or, on the other hand, that Asia is backward, inferior or 
underdeveloped such that it couldn’t possibly address genuine issues of concern 
to the west, the view of the area specialist and imperial agent. Both notions treat 
Asia as passive and see the scholar, be s/he devotee or specialist, as the public’s 
only access to a world otherwise mute. Thus the basic epistemological and 
political structure of orientalism, of activism/passivity, is artifically reinforced 
and maintained.
This is the context in which we must view our common endeavor of Buddhist 
studies. Ultimately we must work to rid ourselves of this structure, which is 
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predicated upon the belief in an Asian or Buddhist “way of thinking,” inscru­
table to the western mind.
III. Imperialism and Buddhist Studies
To return to the question I posed earlier: Why don’t our colleagues in other 
disciplines take our materials as seriously as they deserve? Let me attempt an 
answer by discussing the context in which we understand a text, for example, 
Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakdrika.
Let’s ask ourselves: What are we really studying when we study the MMM 
For some of us, we’re studying the “true meaning’’ of the early Buddhist tradi­
tion. We all know this is the claim the MMK makes about itself. Yet how satisfied 
can we remain with such a normative and uncritical view of our materials? 
Another possible answer is that we are studying a Buddhist text of the first or 
second century ce, something of historical importance to the Buddhist tradition, 
which comes down to saying that we are studying “Buddhism.” What I’d like 
to offer is that we’re doing none of the above. What we’re doing is studying the 
nature of language. What Nagarjuna writes about is not simply of historical 
import, but he tries to explain and describe the very structures of human thinking 
and speaking.
Thus, to understand the text is to squarely confront our hermeneutical situa­
tion. Hans-Georg Gadamer tells us that to understand a text, we must under­
stand “the fundamental concern that motivates the text—the question that it 
seeks to answer and that it imposes again and again to its interpreters.”6 Thus 
what we do as scholars of Buddhism is to enter into the gestalt of issues which 
consume the authors of our texts. What we do is philosophy, psychology, 
literature, hermeneutics or poetics. What we don't do is “Buddhism.” I’m sug­
gesting that our endeavor needs to be understood in terms of disciplines, not in 
terms of geography, or that artificial construct we evoke by the word “Bud­
dhism.” That, too, may be a discourse in a very pernicious form.7
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berke­
ley: University of California Press, 1977), p. xxi.
7 I think this might be what’s suggested by Wilfred Cantwell Smith in The Meaning 
and End of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
With such an understanding of our work, we enter into dialogue with both 
our texts and our colleagues. What’s being suggested is that our materials aren’t 
taken seriously because we don’t take them seriously. As long as we artificially 
bifurcate our world into “east” and “west,” as long as we systematically avoid 
the very dense, issue-oriented world of the authors of our texts, we serve, by 
trivialization, the discourse of orientalism.
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TV. Implications and Recommendations
What does all of this recommend for our common endeavor of Buddhist studies? 
The first thing these ideas tell us is that we need to be aware of the context in 
which we do our work. We live in a world pervaded by orientalism, which is a 
form of racism. One need only look at the structures of our colleges and uni­
versities, the organization of our professional groups, to find this pernicious 
orientalism. A typical American college department of religious studies, if such 
a thing could be said to exist, might be comprised of five members: perhaps 
three in Christianity, one in Judaics, and one in “Asian religions,” another 
name for “the other.” One feature of orientalism is that it imposes a sense of 
sameness onto Asia, an attitude clearly reflected by departmental structures. 
Since Asia is thought of as monolithic, many of us are left with teaching respon­
sibilities subsuming this artificial whole. One need only glance through the book 
review section of our professional journal, the J AAR, to get a sense of what is 
considered important to the field, and what is important certainly is not serious 
work in Buddhism or Hinduism. While there’s not much we can do about these 
things, we can at least be aware of our matrix. We can also seek to inform our 
colleagues about the richness and pluralism of Asia through our work.
Our work, therefore, should be less categorical and more specific. We cannot 
accept this discourse of sameness, so we must be very clear about the parameters 
and limits of our studies in historical, textual, and conceptual terms. Moreover, 
we need more issue-orientation is our scholarship. What I am advocating are 
comparative studies in a double sense.
The first sense is obvious: explicit comparisons of how issues of concern are 
treated by Buddhist and non-Buddhist authors. But even more important is the 
way in which we go about translating our texts, which is perhaps the primary 
arena of our work.
Our translations should be informed by the disciplinary questions which our 
texts raise. This is to say that a new translation of the MMK would probably 
need to be informed by the discourse known in the west as language analysis, 
for example.® If we are translating a tantric text about mind, then we need 
various psychological vocabularies. If we’re working on Dignaga, then we 
should be seeking our vocabulary from western logical and epistemological 
disciplines.
One proposal is that we should be translating Sanskrit or Tibetan texts into 
good, everyday English, letting the text speak for itself. I find this alternative *
8 This is an important feature of the excellent translation by Mcrvyn Sprung in 
Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapada 
of Candrakirtl (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979).
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utterly specious; one reason is that these texts were not written in everyday 
Sanskrit or Tibetan in the first place, but rather were written in highly articulate, 
philosophic and technical idioms. How could we, then, claim to be in the business 
of translating unless we employ analogous vocabularies? There is no one 
English, just as there is no one Sanskrit or Tibetan. Rather, there are many 
“language games” within a language, and the first task of the translator is one 
of matching up appropriate discourses. Any English we might use for translating 
is loaded; there is no obvious, naive choice. Therefore, however we translate, 
we are re-presenting the text. This is not a weakness, but the very starting point 
of our dialogue with the text. “The familiar horizons of the interpreter’s world,” 
Gadamer writes, “though perhaps more difficult to grasp thematically, are 
is integral a part of the event of understanding as are the explicit procedures 
by which he assimilates the alien object”9 We need no apologies, we need 
honesty. The process of understanding the text entails a self-understanding, 
even if this is only an understanding of one’s conceptual, political, and historical 
matrices. What we do is interpret, not merely translate, and what we need is to 
incorporate into our studies this reflexive aspect of interpretation.
9 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. xii.
With such informed translations, textual studies, and conceptual analyses, 
by the very fact of our intellectual honesty, we may arrive at a response to our 
initial question. Taking our texts seriously entails taking our world seriously, 
and it is only by virtue of such seriousness that our work may begin to reach the 
world co-inhabited by our colleagues.
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